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Virtue, Obligation and Politics 
STEPHEN G. SALKEVER 
Bryn Mawr College 
Recently, several students of moral philoso- 
phy have pointed out that even our most self- 
consciously philosophical understanding of 
morality and ethics is strongly conditioned by 
the concepts we use in discussing moral and 
ethical questions. It has been suggested by 
Anscombe,' Cunningham,2 Frankena,' and 
Hampshire,4 that the conclusions we draw con- 
cerning the answers to ethical questions depend 
heavily upon the concepts and categories we 
use in posing and interpreting those questions. 
One example of this kind of difference be- 
tween various conceptions of morality is de- 
veloped in Frankena's discussion of the distinc- 
tion between an ethics of virtue and an ethics 
of obligation:5 our answer to the basic ethical 
question, What ought I do? will change as our 
interpretation of that question changes from 
What is the virtuous thing to do? to What am 
I obligated to do? Our subsequent ethical 
theory, it is suggested, will depend upon the 
way in which we interpret the "ought" of the 
basic question, whether in terms of "virtue" 
(or "way of life") or in terms of "obligation."' 
If this is so, then one important task of con- 
1 G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," 
reprinted in The Is-Ought Question, ed. William D. 
Hudson (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 175-195. 
2 Stanley B. Cunningham, "Does 'Does Moral Phi- 
losophy Rest upon a Mistake' Make an Even Greater 
Mistake?," Monist, 54 (January, 1970), 86-99. 
3William K. Frankena, "Prichard and the Ethics 
of Virtue," Monist, 54 (January, 1970), 1-17. Both 
Cunningham and Frankena take as their point of 
departure H. A. Prichard's paradigm-setting essay, 
"Does Moral Philosophy Rest upon a Mistake?," re- 
printed in Prichard, Moral Obligation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 1-17. 
4Stuart Hampshire, "A New Philosophy of the 
Just Society," New York Review of Books, February 
24, 1972, pp. 34-39. Hampshire's article is an ex- 
tended review of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer- 
sity Press, 1971). Both Hampshire and Marshall 
Cohen (in his review of Rawls's book in The New 
York Times Book Review, July 16, 1972, p. 1) 
praise Rawls's study; but both, and especially Hamp- 
shire, have reservations about the value of Rawls's 
political theory, reservations which are based on their 
feeling that Rawls has not sufficiently explored the 
possibilities of what I will be calling the language 
of virtue in political philosophy. See Hampshire, 
p. 38, and Cohen, p. 18. 
5Frankena argues that "moral philosophy must 
fully explore the possibility of a satisfactory ethics 
of virtue as an alternative or supplement to one of 
obligation . . . ," ("Prichard and the Ethics of 
Virtue," p. 17). 
temporary moral philosophy becomes the clari- 
fication of significant differences between vari- 
ous characteristic ways of conceptualizing the 
basic ethical question. This project of clarifica- 
tion can have at least two important results: 
first, it can help us avoid confusion in the 
process of comparing various ethical theories; 
and second, we may be able to develop argu- 
ments to suggest that one or another ethical 
language is best equipped to deal with the 
broadest possible range of substantive ethical 
questions. 
In this paper I am going to suggest that this 
particular project of clarification is as impor- 
tant for students of politics and political phi- 
losophy as it is for students of ethics and 
moral philosophy.6 In particular, I want to di- 
rect attention to two basic ways of interpreting 
or understanding the meaning of politics as an 
activity: politics conceived as a problem of 
moral and intellectual virtue, and politics con- 
ceived as a problem of obligation and legit- 
imacy. While these two are surely not the only 
ways of thinking and speaking about politics, 
it may be fair to say that, leaving theological 
conceptions aside, the politics of virtue and 
the politics of obligation and legitimacy are the 
two alternative political languages presented to 
us most clearly by the history of political 
thought. 
Politics and Virtue 
Now the conjunction of "politics" and the 
problem of "moral and intellectual virtue" is 
not an ordinary or familiar one. especially to 
twentieth-century students of politics and po- 
litical philosophy; indeed, one concern of this 
paper will be to explain why this pairing may 
appear to us to be not merely odd, but absurd. 
At any rate, I think it will be easily admitted 
that when we think about what constitutes the 
political, about what distinguishes the political 
relationship from other kinds of human rela- 
tionships, such as love or war or trade or 
scholarship, we are not likely to regard the 
6 The distinction between ethics (or morality) and 
politics is itself the result of a particular way of 
understanding both ethics and politics. In my terms, 
the distinction is much more appropriate and im- 
portant to politics conceived in terms of obligation 
(for which ethics tends to become the residual class 
of all nonobligatory "duties"), than to politics con- 
ceived in terms of virtue or ways of life. 
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distinction between moral and intellectual vir- 
tue as being of critical relevance. Instead, I 
think it is fair to say that for the central 
tendencies of modern political philosophy, the 
basic political question is not about virtue of 
any sort, but rather about the reconciliation of 
the requirements (needs and desires) of the 
individual and the requirements of society as a 
whole. In other words, the modern answer to 
the question, What is politics? is character- 
istically dependent upon our answer to the 
question of political obligation, Why should I 
obey the law? Politics thus becomes that ac- 
tivity that occurs within the sphere constituted 
by legitimate authority.7 Although it may be 
excessively simple, I do not think it grossly 
distorting to say that for modern political 
thought the fundamental and defining political 
distinction is not between intellectual (and 
nonpolitical) and moral (or political) virtue, 
but between two forms of social control: 
power (which is nonpolitical) and authority 
(which is political).8 These distinctions are in- 
tended only as a description of what I take to 
be the major tendency in modern political 
thought. I am not suggesting that there is neces- 
sarily any logical incompatibility between poli- 
tics understood in terms of virtue and politics 
understood in terms of obligation; rather, the 
distinction points to a difference in emphasis.9 
Perhaps the best-known brief statement of 
this aspect of the modern view concerning the 
foundations of politics is Rousseau's: "Man is 
born free, and everywhere he is in chains . . . 
How did this change happen? I do not know. 
What can make it legitimate? I think I can 
resolve that question."'0 Rousseau's political 
philosophy, like most serious political thought 
I Throughout this paper I will refer to "contem- 
porary political philosophy" as if there were one 
single position or school that could be identified in 
this way. This is surely an oversimplification, but I 
think such an identification is plausible, as well as 
useful for the purposes of my argument. For ex- 
amples of this position, consider Concepts in Social 
and Political Philosophy, ed. Richard E. Flathman (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Political Philosophy, 
ed. Anthony Quinton (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1967); and David Raphael, Problems of Po- 
litical Philosophy (New York: Praeger, 1970). There 
are undeniably some notable nonconforming sum- 
mary conceptions of the tasks of political philosophy, 
such as that of George Kateb, Political Theory (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 3. 
'A different and more complex formulation of the 
distinction between power and authority is presented 
by Hannah Arendt in On Violence (New York: Har- 
court, Brace & World, Inc., 1970), pp. 44-45. 
'See Below, p. 90. For a similar characterization, 
see J. Peter Euben, "Walzer's Obligations," Philoso- 
phy and Public Affairs, 1 (Summer, 1972), 438-459. 
10 Social Contract, book I, chapter 1, in Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres Completes, Bernard Gag- 
from the seventeenth century down to the pres- 
ent time, takes as its theme the question of why 
free individuals should obey the law of society, 
if they were not in fact compelled to do so. 
If no plausible answer can be given to this 
question, then civil or legal authority as we 
know it is merely a mask for power, and 
politics is nothing more than a disguised or 
sublimated version of war or incarceration."' 
On this view, the problem of political philoso- 
phy becomes that of defining the difference be- 
tween the political relationship and the condi- 
tions that obtain on battlefields and in prisons. 
All of this, on the surface at least, is very re- 
mote from the question of moral and intel- 
lectual virtue. The preoccupation of that politi- 
cal philosophy which develops around the 
question of political obligation seems to be with 
the difference between politics and slavery, 
rather than the difference between politics and 
nebin and Marcel Raymond, eds. (Paris: Bibliotheque 
de la P16iade, Editions Gallimard, 1959-), III, 351. 
Cf. Social Contract (First Version), book I, chapter 
3, O.C. III, 289: "Man is born free, and nevertheless 
he is everywhere in chains" (emphasis added). Speak- 
ing of the paradigmatic character of this passage, 
John Carnes makes the following comment: "This 
paragraph . . . might be taken as the motto, not 
only of social contract theory, but of the whole of 
political theory." "Myths, Bliks, and the Social Con- 
tract," Journal of Value Inquiry, 4 (Summer, 1970), 
105-118, at 114. 
"' Or, less dramatically, of the marketplace. The 
view that the disappearance of politics is a necessary 
consequence of the fundamental premises of modern 
moral and political philosophy is stated in a plausible 
manner by R. P. Wolff: "If all men have a con- 
tinuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of 
autonomy possible, then there would appear to be 
no state whose subjects have a moral obligation to 
obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a de jure 
legitimate state would appear to be vacuous, and 
philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only 
reasonable political belief for an enlightened man." 
In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1970), p. 19. See also Wolff, "On Violence," 
Journal of Philosophy, 66 (October 2, 1969), 601- 
616. The less than plausible aspect of Wolff's argu- 
ment is that once he has shown that the political 
problem can not be solved in terms of the language 
of obligation and legitimacy, he concludes that the 
problem is simply insoluble. This conclusion neglects 
the possibility, that the problem might be solvable 
in some other terms, or (as I shall try to show) that 
the problem itself is the result of certain prior philo- 
sophical presuppositions, and hence is only one pos- 
sible philosophical conception of politics among sev- 
eral, all of which must be considered before we say 
that political philosophy as such secretes philosophi- 
cal anarchism. An interesting discussion of the re- 
lationship between descriptive conceptions of politics 
and normative political rules is provided by Charles 
Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Philoso- 
phy, Politics and Society, 3rd series, ed. Peter Las- 
lett and W. G. Runciman (New York: Barnes and 
Noble, 1967), pp. 25-57. 
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philosophy."1 It is by no means obvious that 
anything is intrinsically wrong with this lower- 
ing of the horizon of political philosophy. I 
will try to suggest, however, that the most 
important types of theory that characteristically 
result from an obligation conception of politics 
may be unsound insofar as they are unable to 
give an adequate account of some important 
political phenomena that can better be dis- 
cussed in terms of moral and intellectual virtue. 
The discussion of politics by way of the 
question of moral and intellectual virtue is a 
procedure followed not by Rousseau (at least, 
not in the Social Contract), but by ancient 
political philosophy. In the political works of 
Plato and Aristotle, the question of legitimate 
authority appears to be subordinate to the ques- 
tion, How ought human beings to live? or, 
What is the best life for man?'3 Plato and 
Aristotle both seem to suggest that before it is 
possible to consider the question of legitimate 
authority, it is necessary to consider why any- 
one should choose to enter a political relation- 
ship in the first place. We enter into an eco- 
nomic relationship, for example, in signing a 
contract for the sale or purchase of some 
product, because by doing so we can expect to 
obtain something we desire. But what analogous 
but distinct value can be obtained from choos- 
ing to become a citizen? The answer to this 
question is surely difficult and complex, but at 
least we might begin by saying that any such 
answer would depend upon the answer to yet 
another question, namely, What kinds of things 
are good for human beings? That is to say, the 
problem of defining the political as distinct 
from (for example) the economic has some- 
thing to do with the problem of distinguishing 
the public good from the private goods of in- 
dividuals. The definition of the political in- 
volves the movement from the private to the 
public, and from the private to the public per- 
spective on the question, What is desirable? 
Now, in order to give a perfectly adequate ac- 
12 1 do not mean to suggest that these /two con- 
cerns are necessarily mutually exclusive, although a 
concentration on one of these distinctions might well 
require an abstraction from the other (since each 
distinction tends to appear insignificant when viewed 
from the perspective of the other). Consider, for 
example, Aristotle's abstraction from (or at the very 
least, obscuring of) intellectual virtue when he pre- 
sents the grounds for distinguishing between slaves 
and free men (citizens) in Politics 1. 5. 1259b22- 
1260a34. 
13 See Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: 
Rand McNally, Inc., 1964), chapters 1 and 2. For 
Rawls, and for modern political thought in general, 
this question can not be rationally answered. See 
A Theory of Justice, section 50. 
count of the public good, it is necessary to say 
something about the good of that most inclu- 
sive of all publics, the human species. Of 
course, in order to understand what the human 
good is, it is necessary to understand what the 
human, as such, is. In this way, it seems that 
there is a direct path from the political ques- 
tion to the human question, since we can fully 
answer the question of whether or how political 
life is choiceworthy only on the basis of an 
understanding of what human beings are-an 
understanding, that is to say, of human na- 
ture.'4 
For example, suppose we were to assert that 
the central or defining characteristic of human 
activity is the attempt to maximize (privately 
defined) pleasure or to minimize (privately de- 
fined) pain or both.'5 Human beings could 
then have nothing in common but the common 
pursuit of individually determined goals. The 
political life, then, distinguished by a concern 
for the common or public good, would be 
worth following only if it proved to be instru- 
mental or useful in terms of our nonpolitical 
(for instance, economic) goals. Of course, some 
people might simply find their private happi- 
ness in public life, but given this understand- 
ing of human nature, there can be no common 
or communicable reason for choosing politics 
for its own sake.16 On the other hand, if it 
"I Anscombe's criticism of the ethics of obligation 
rests in part on the argument that an adequate 
moral philosophy is impossible without an adequate 
philosophical psychology; that is, it is impossible to 
say what a good action is until we are clear about 
"what a human action is at all." "Modern Moral 
Philosophy," p. 179. Stuart Hampshire argues that 
any idea of human goodness depends on some idea 
of "the distinctive powers of humanity." Thought 
and Action (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), 
chapter 4. Stephen Clark discusses and defends the 
Aristotelian argument from "distinctive powers" to 
moral principle in "The Use of 'Man's Function' in 
Aristotle," Ethics, 82 (July, 1972), 269-283. 
15 This is the basis of John Stuart Mill's proof of the 
utility principle in Utilitarianism, chapter 4. The dif- 
ficulty here is that in this view of human action, 
rational interpersonal comparison becomes impos- 
sible. Rawls (p. 174) attempts to overcome this diffi- 
culty by specifying the existence of certain objec- 
tive "primary social goods, things that every rational 
person is presumed to want whatever else he wants." 
A critical account of Rawls's attempt is given by 
Adina Schwartz, "Moral Neutrality and Primary 
Goods," Ethics, 83 (July, 1973), 294-307. 
6 This view is suggested by, among others, Hobbes: 
"The passions that incline men to peace, are fear 
of death; desire of such things as are necessary to 
commodious living; and a hope by their industry to 
obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient arti- 
cles of peace, upon which men may be drawn into 
agreement." Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Ox- 
ford: Blackwell's Political Texts, Basil Blackwell, 
1946), chapter 13, p. 84. The classical criticism of 
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were presupposed that human life activity is 
constituted or defined by the possibility of 
creating and obeying nonpersonal (or nonsub- 
jective) public standards or goals, then it might 
reasonably be argued that political life is always 
choiceworthy so long as it is not only an in- 
strument of private gain, and regardless of 
what particular public goal stands at the center 
of the political order.'7 
The procedure by which a discussion of the 
meaning of politics is linked to a discussion of 
moral and intellectual virtue by way of a con- 
sideration of the question of human nature, is 
followed explicitly by Plato and Aristotle; a 
brief summary of this procedure may be useful 
to show one way in which virtue and politics 
may be thought of as interdependent. Now 
although Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Poli- 
tics, for example, differ in many important re- 
spects, both works conceive human activity as 
being fundamentally threefold. Like other ani- 
mals, human beings have a capacity for growth 
and a desire to promote that growth. We eat, 
drink, mate, and experience the pleasures and 
pains connected with these and similar move- 
ments. This range of experience is said to be 
private or nonpolitical in the sense that these 
activities and feelings would always occur, 
whether there were such things as politics (or 
publics) or not. This is not to say that sur- 
vival and growth are politically irrelevant; how- 
ever, ancient political philosophy as a whole 
appears to contend that if this were all there 
were to human life there would be no such 
thing as politics, strictly speaking. In fact, since 
these activities are in no way peculiar to the 
beings we call human, since they are common 
to many animals, it would be reasonable to say 
that if these activities were descriptive of the 
entire range of human activities there would be 
this conception of politics as an alliance for the pur- 
pose of avoiding death is presented by Aristotle, 
Politics, 3. 5. 1280a25-1281a9. According to Aris- 
totle, such an alliance is a necessary precondition of 
politics, but is not itself political. 
17 This conception of human nature and politics is 
drawn from some modern writers who might be 
called existentialist or historicist, such as F. Nietzsche, 
Beyond Good and Evil, Section 188; Ortega y Gasset, 
Revolt of the Masses, chapter 13 (beginning). Jean- 
Paul Sartre's contention that man defines himself by 
his "project" seems to be in line with this develop- 
ment; see Search For a Method, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp. 150 ff. A case might 
be made that such a view also informs Kant's moral 
philosophy; at least, it seems to be present in the 
neo-Kantian interpretations of Rousseau, such as those 
of Ernst Cassirer and Robert DerathM. For example, 
see Derath6's discussion in his Le Rationalisme de 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1948), pp. 182ff. 
no such thing as a separate human species, 
strictly speaking. This is perhaps what Aris- 
totle means by saying that there is no human 
virtue or excellence in being healthy.18 Human 
activity connected with the provision of the 
commodities that can support and secure hu- 
man life does not, by itself, yield an answer 
to the question of the best human life. The only 
virtue belonging to our desire for private pos- 
sessions-food, wealth, ornament, and so on- 
lies in the subordination of that desire to some 
other principle. From the perspective of an- 
cient political philosophy, then, there is no such 
thing as a good or excellent or virtuous eco- 
nomic man (meaning by this term someone 
who is entirely devoted to and adept in the art 
of survival).19 
Roughly speaking, there are two ways in 
which this subordination can take place: the 
political life and the philosophic life. Politics 
here is understood to be a relationship among 
individual human beings in which some public 
value or law takes the place of private desire as 
the most authoritative guide to action. Politics, 
from this perspective, is not understood as be- 
ing constituted by any contract or obligation, 
but rather by the attempt to replace the human 
capacity for selfishness by the human capacity 
for justice (however understood) and self- 
control as the principal motivating factor in 
human action. Politics is said to be a choice- 
worthy way of life because it is the medium 
within which the development of moral virtue 
"8Aristotle Politics 7. 13., Nicomachean Ethics 1. 13. 
19 I will be using the opposition economic man/ 
political man throughout this paper. It is intended 
to express the distinction between a life directed by 
private or personal desire or inclination, and a life 
directed by a strong sense of public duty. "Economic," 
as I use it, then, is not to be equated with "com- 
mercial" (since it could also refer to crime, self- 
defense, art, and hobbies), although commercial ac- 
tivity is one of the most common and important 
forms of economic activity, in my sense of the word. 
The idea of economic activity (in this broad sense) 
as opposed and in some way prior to political ac- 
tivity is discussed by Aristotle Politics 3. 5., and 
by Plato in his description of the immediate predeces- 
sor of the genuine polis in the Republic Book II, 
371d4ff. The applicability of the concept of economic 
man to early modern political thought is suggested 
by C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Pos- 
sessive Individualism (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), and by Leo Strauss, Natural Right and 
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 
chapter 5. John Rawls places himself squarely in 
this tradition of political thought when he argues 
for the appropriateness of the model of rational 
(economic) choice for all moral and political situa- 
tions. For Rawls, political philosophy is understood 
to be a special case (choice under uncertainty) of 
the theory of rational choice. A Theory of Justice, 
p. 172. 
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or virtues (such as justice and self-control) are 
possible. Man is by nature the political animal 
not because he ordinarily lives in things called 
cities or polities, but because it is through poli- 
tics and the political relationship (as opposed, 
say, to the economic) that human beings can 
achieve that excellence of character (moral 
virtue) which is potential in their nature. To 
say that an individual is living politically or 
according to moral virtue is to say something 
about the principles according to which he acts, 
the goals he tries to attain and the values he 
tries to maximize in his decisions and his prac- 
tices. The character of these principles, goals, 
and values provides the critical difference be- 
tween the private or economic life and the 
public or political life. Politics, then, is under- 
stood as the pursuit of a certain way or style 
of life, rather than as obedience to a certain 
type of authority;20 what distinguishes politics 
from other activities are its ends or purposes 
rather than its manner of institution.21 The dif- 
ference between these two conceptions of poli- 
tics appears in the two questions which they 
might pose in the process of determining 
whether a particular association were political 
(as opposed to merely economic or despotic): 
Aristotle and Plato would ask, Is it according 
to nature (Does it enhance the strictly human 
aspects of human nature) ?,22 while the greater 
part of modern political philosophy, following 
Rousseau, would say, Is it legitimate (Is con- 
trol founded on consent)? For both Aristotle 
and Rousseau, a theoretical understanding of 
politics requires a distinction between what is 
called political and what is genuinely political; 
20 Rawls excludes the issue of ways of life from 
the range of rational deliberation on fundamental 
political questions. Rational public decisions can only 
be made about the distribution of primary social 
goods, not about the encouragement of certain life 
styles or ways of life making use of those goods. 
Rawls, pp. 142-145. Both Hampshire, p. 38, and 
Cohen, p. 18, in their reviews of Rawls, regard this 
as a shortcoming of Rawls's theory of justice. 
21 This is not to say that the ends of a polity and 
its manner of institution (or integration) may not 
have real consequences for one another, but that 
what is most particularly important about politics 
(as a distinct human activity) are its ends or goals. 
2 Plato is surely not as firmly committed as Aris- 
totle to the appropriateness of the natural standard 
for evaluating politics. This will appear, I think, if 
we compare Book 1 of the Politics with the cave 
story and the myth of Er in the Republic. Plato's 
doubts, however, seem to center not on the suit- 
ability of the natural standard for judging politics, 
but on whether the differences among polities are 
significant in the light of the natural standard. In 
other words, the doubt is not about the standard, 
but about politics. 
the two differ with respect to the terms in 
which this distinction should be drawn.23 
The problem of distinguishing politics as a 
separate way of life does end with the exhibi- 
tion of the line between the political and the 
subpolitical; for ancient philosophy, the ques- 
tion, How ought we to live? can not be restated 
as the choice between pursuing politics and pur- 
suing private (economic) goals. There is a 
third possible alternative for human beings, 
resting upon a third potentially dominant prin- 
ciple of human nature, and that is the life of 
the philosopher, the way of life displayed by 
Socrates. This life is the attempt to actualize to 
the fullest possible extent the human capacity 
for rational understanding. If the economic life 
is dominated by the love of self (or of life), 
and the political life by a love of the city (and 
of having a "good name" in the city), the 
philosophic life is controlled by the love of 
truth or of being.24 The excellence which be- 
longs to this way of life is called, by Aristotle, 
intellectual virtue. According to both Plato and 
Aristotle, the philosophic life is unquestionably 
superior to the political life for the same reason 
that politics is superior to the economic life: it 
corresponds to a superior aspect of human 
capacity, to a higher part of human nature. 
One way to understand this determination of 
superiority is to compare the three possible 
ways of life with respect to their self-sufficiency. 
Economic man's needs are practically limitless; 
he is Hobbes's natural man, committed to a 
perpetual and (finally) perpetually hopeless 
search for security and well-being. Political man 
is less concerned with security than with acting 
well, being just, courageous, and so on. But 
political activity of this sort requires more than 
the simple possession of a good character, even 
where good character is accompanied by good 
judgment; opportunity and means are as neces- 
sary as motive for the commission of political 
or moral acts, and neither a citizen nor a city 
has much hope of achieving political excel- 
lence if restricted by poverty, weakness, and 
isolation. Although the dependence on con- 
23 For Aristotle, the distinction has to be made in 
teleological terms. See Politics 3. 5. Consider also 
his discussion of citizenship in Book 3 of the Poli- 
tics, which turns on the difference between those 
who are really citizens and those who are only called 
citizens. The difference between the merely conven- 
tional and the real citizen is stated in terms of the 
purpose of politics. 
2 The description and comparison of different 
ways of life in terms of their desiring or erotic di- 
mension is provided by Plato in the Republic Book 
5, 474c8 to the end of Book 5. 
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tingency is less, successful politics, like the 
quest for security, requires favorable external 
circumstances. But this is not true of the wise 
man, of the person who can successfully pursue 
the philosophic way of life and claim intel- 
lectual virtue.25 All that the wise man requires 
to exercise his wisdom is his mind and the 
universe. Of course, a wise man is still a human 
being and not a disembodied spirit; he at least 
needs food and shelter, just as you and I, and 
as such he is surely dependent upon circum- 
stance in the way that all human beings are. 
But the philosopher as philosopher, that is, 
while he is engaged in the activity of under- 
standing which marks him as a man of intel- 
lectual virtue, is utterly self-sufficient in a way 
that can not be matched by the man of moral 
virtue, the political man, in his characteristic 
activity. 
This discussion began with a distinction be- 
tween two kinds of political inquiry, the one 
(the more modern and familiar) beginning 
with the question, Why should I obey the laws? 
(or, What can make obedience legitimate?), 
and the other with the question, What is the 
best life for man? It was suggested that one 
difficulty with the first approach is that it may 
not be able to distinguish authority from 
power, or to give an account or defense of 
politics as an independently valuable kind of 
activity. But now it seems that the second 
variety of political philosophy leads by a dif- 
ferent route to a similar difficulty. In the first 
case, politics threatens to slip beyond the hori- 
zon of human aspiration, while in the second 
it descends beneath human dignity. For if, 
according to Plato and Aristotle, the philo- 
sophic life is the best life for man, the way of 
life which best answers to the potentiality of 
human nature, then what becomes of politics, 
the way of life whose virtue is principally moral 
(of character or disposition) rather than intel- 
lectual (of understanding)? I have suggested 
that for ancient philosophy politics is under- 
stood to claim our admiration because at its 
best it can turn us from selfishness to moral 
virtue. But how can one continue to praise 
moral virtue in the light of the enormous su- 
periority of intellectual virtue? From the per- 
spective of the philosophic life, at least, differ- 
25 In speaking of "philosophers" here I am not 
referring to the substantial professional group that 
sometimes goes by that name. I am also obscuring, 
because of the nature of this introductory context, 
any possible differences between a philosopher (a 
lover of truth and wisdom) and a wise man (a pos- 
sessor of truth). 
ences between the best statesman and the worst 
murderer or tyrant may appear to be insig- 
nificant or largely accidental.26 
Now the thrust of this implicit attack on the 
political life is tempered to a certain extent 
because the perspective of philosophy is also 
presented by the ancients as being incredibly 
difficult to obtain, so difficult that a general 
recommendation to live a life of pure intellec- 
tion would be as absurd as recommending a 
life consisting of an infinite series of four 
minute miles. Still, I do not mean to suggest 
that the assertion of the difficulty (and for 
most men, the impossibility) of living the 
philosophic life in any way removes the diffi- 
culty about justifying moral virtue or politics. 
No matter how few individuals have the nat- 
ural equipment to aspire to a life of intel- 
lectual virtue, it remains the best life for 
human beings as such (and hence, in principle, 
for all human beings insofar as they are hu- 
man); this conclusion about the best life has 
the force of consigning all but a very few to 
lives which are subhuman in that they can not 
be justified or defended by word or reason 
(logos) rather than by brute force. The human 
situation seems to be defined by the not alto- 
gether free choice between two alternatives: 
the philosophic life, which is incredibly diffi- 
cult but of superhuman sublimity; and the 
private life, which involves satisfying the most 
powerful of human passions and desires, and is 
thus easy, but (nonmetaphorically) brutally in- 
human. Politics and moral virtue, if they exist 
at all, are located between these two variously 
disquieting human possibilities. Strange as it 
surely sounds to our ears, the problem of poli- 
tics, the question of whether or not (and in 
what way) politics is a valuable and justifiable 
life style appears, in this analysis, to be identi- 
cal with the problem of moral virtue. Before 
turning to some of the consequences of this 
conception of the problem of politics, let me 
step back for a moment and try to clarify the 
basic vocabulary of the political problem un- 
derstood as the problem of moral virtue. 
2"It can be argued that this is, in fact, the Platonic 
view. See Statesman 257b2-4, and Republic Book 
10, 619b7-dl. Sometimes Plato does suggest there 
can be substantial differences in quality among dif- 
ferent nonphilosophic ways of life. But these sug- 
gestions often appear to rest upon what are for Plato 
suspect (or nonphilosophic) premises, such as the 
quantifiability of human happiness (Republic Book 
9, 587blO-588alO; Protagoras 356c4-357b5), or the 
adequacy of traditional piety (Crito 53a9-54dl). This is 
not to say that these differences are unimportant from 
some nonphilosophic perspective-such as that of 
the citizen. 
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Kinds of Virtue 
I have been employing the concepts "moral" 
and "intellectual virtue" without defining them 
directly, hoping to indicate some of their sense 
contextually. Any definition would have to be- 
gin by confessing that they are, in fact, fairly 
literal translations of the Greek expressions 
areti ethiki and arete dianojtike. Undoubtedly, 
some more idiomatic and familiar translation 
would have been possible, but I have chosen to 
say "moral virtue" and "intellectual virtue" in 
spite of the odd and stilted sound of these 
phrases because I want to emphasize, rather 
than conceal, the fact that these concepts are 
foreign to our contemporary political vocabu- 
lary and political understanding. The value of 
discussing politics by means of these terms de- 
pends in large measure upon their difference 
from the political language we have become 
accustomed to using, the language which is 
informed by political obligation and legitimacy. 
If, as I shall try to suggest, there is some 
plausible doubt concerning the value or the 
usefulness of the language of political obliga- 
tion, it would be foolish to try to translate all 
unfamiliar political philosophy into that lan- 
guage, as for instance by setting out to discover 
Aristotle's or Plato's theory of political obliga- 
tion, when it would be much more important 
to know why these writers do not speak of a 
theory of political obligation, but speak of 
moral and political virtues instead. So it will 
be necessary to risk seeming pompous and 
stuffy, for the sake of exploring the meaning 
and consequences of this generally forgotten or 
rejected way of considering politics. 
One of the major problems in translating 
areti by "virtue" is that the Greek word has 
a much more extensive signification than does 
the modern English one. Aretj does mean 
virtue or goodness, but it also refers to a 
quality we would be more likely to call "ex- 
cellence." For example, a skilled shoemaker, or 
painter, or athlete might be said to possess 
virtue in the sense of areti; the same would be 
true for a fast horse, a strong ox, or a prize 
pumpkin: generally, a subject is said to be 
virtuous (possess the quality of areti) when 
he displays skill in or aptitude for a particular 
sort of activity. A thing done well thus becomes 
a thing done virtuously, and the doer is said 
to be virtuous insofar as that particular ac- 
tivity is concerned; this does not mean that a 
virtuous shoemaker, or craftsman, or merchant 
is necessarily a virtuous human being. This is 
a very broad meaning of "virtue," much dif- 
ferent from our own which seems to refer 
mainly to chastity or innocence and perhaps 
also to a rather more than slightly unbalanced 
asceticism. From this perspective, it naturally 
seems very odd to see Plato and Aristotle talk- 
ing about virtue being the principal concern of 
politics. The oddness is certainly and genuinely 
there, but it is possible and necessary to climb 
out of the confines of our ordinary language 
at least to the extent of not confusing oddness 
with unintelligibility. My purpose in thus con- 
trasting the ancient and the contemporary 
meanings of virtue is certainly not to sneer at 
any supposed moral decay, but rather to warn 
against the warm and comfortable feeling that 
we have somehow or other gone beyond con- 
fusing virtue and politics. In a sense, we have 
"gone beyond" understanding virtue as being 
politically relevant-good conduct being un- 
derstood for the most part as being a strictly 
private matter-but it is not true that this 
going beyond simply involves the obviously de- 
sirable rejection of an absurd and oppressive 
dogma. 
It appears that according to ancient philoso- 
phy, the relationship between politics and vir- 
tue can be stated as follows: the city (or polity 
or political community) is that structure (or 
pattern of relationships) which has as its aim 
the development of moral virtue among its 
citizens. Polities or political systems can, in 
principle, be evaluated on the basis of how 
successfully they carry out this function, bear- 
ing in mind that the success or failure of a 
polity, like that of moral virtue itself, is de- 
pendent upon circumstance as well as upon in- 
tention. One can hardly blame a poor city or 
nation, or one which is under severe and con- 
tinual military attack, for failing to educate its 
citizens in those virtues which require leisure 
and peace for their exercise. Still, the principle 
of moral virtue provides the basic rule for judg- 
ing politics, and for deciding whether the po- 
litical life (either as such or in a given city) 
is justifiable: the meaning and the possibility of 
politics stands or falls with the meaning and 
the possibility of moral virtue. This is not to 
say that the standard of virtue is an easy or a 
clear one to apply;27 a much clearer assess- 
ment can be made by applying one of the more 
27 The most consistent application of a standard 
of this kind is to be found in Aristotle's Politics, 
perhaps most clearly in Book 7. J. J. Mulhern ex- 
plains the complexity of the Aristotelian standard in 
"Pantachou Kata Physin he AristZ," Phronesis, 12 
(1972), 260-268. See also Plato Republic Book 10, 
599c6-d4, Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, vol. I, 
Book 5, and Rousseau, Discourse on the Arts and 
Sciences. The applicability of such a standard to con- 
temporary politics is considered by Walter Berns, 
"Pornography vs. Democracy: A Case for Censorship," 
Public Interest, 22 (Winter, 1971), 3-24, and by 
Wilson Carey McWilliams's response to Berns, in the 
same issue, pp. 32-38. 
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typical contemporary rules, like level of eco- 
nomic growth, or level of individual liberty, or 
even level of legitimacy (perhaps defined as 
the extent of public approval of the regime, or 
the consent of the governed). The great diffi- 
culty with moral virtue as a rule of political 
evaluation comes from the difficulty of saying 
just what moral virtue is, even if we grant the 
possibility that it is, in fact, some thing at all. 
But leaving aside for the moment the ques- 
tion of what the content of moral virtue is, we 
are in a position to say what kind of thing it is 
we are looking for: moral virtue is that quality 
on account of whose presence we praise ac- 
tions or characters as being good. Furthermore, 
it appears to be something different from and 
inferior to intellectual virtue, a quality which 
distinguishes good understandings or minds. 
Since human life can presumably be primarily 
devoted either to action or to contemplation 
(or understanding), the moral question of the 
greatest importance becomes how, and under 
what conditions, one should choose to commit 
oneself either to action or to contemplation. As 
suggested above, when the problem is stated in 
this way it becomes very difficult to see how 
anyone could defend, as opposed to simply ex- 
cusing, the choice of the political life. But 
perhaps this problem can be avoided by ex- 
amining more closely some other aspects of the 
relationship between moral and intellectual 
virtue, aside from the simple assertion of the 
superiority of intellectual virtue with respect to 
the criterion of self-sufficiency. 
The complexity of the relationship begins to 
appear when we notice that to state the prob- 
lem of moral and intellectual virtue in terms of 
the necessity to choose between them obscures 
the fact that action generally involves thought 
of some sort (like the choice to act or not to 
act in a certain way) and that even the most 
abstract contemplation is in some sense relevant 
to action, at least in the sense that it involves 
or requires abstention from action. We might 
say that political or moral men necessarily 
philosophize to a certain extent, and that phil- 
osophers are politicians whether they will it or 
not. In other words, that thought and action 
cannot, as a matter of fact, be indifferent to 
one another; no account of politics can be 
complete without a consideration of the effect 
of politics upon contemplation, and any ac- 
count of the pursuit of wisdom or scientific 
inquiry would have to be concerned with the 
political or moral consequences of following the 
life of intellectual virtue.28 For example, if we 
28 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics Book 10, 1178bl- 
10; Politics Book 8, 1325a-b; Plato Republic, Book 
1, 347b5-d9. One of the great questions of the Re- 
praise intellectual virtue (as ancient philosophy 
does) as being the best life a human being can 
choose to follow, we are not only providing an 
implicit criticism of the political or moral life 
but actually recommending a course of conduct 
which will tend to detract from the amount of 
human energy devoted to politics. Given the 
inaccessibility of the intellectual or scientific 
life for most people, it might well be that the 
praise of contemplation involves the commis- 
sion of a very great wrong. Whether or how 
this is so can only be known if we can give 
an account of the value of moral virtue, if we 
can justify the political life as being preferable 
to the life devoted to the private pursuit of 
privately defined goals, which I have called the 
economic life. The problem of political philoso- 
phy, beginning from the question, What is the 
best life for man? becomes the problem of in- 
tellectual and moral virtue: How, on what 
grounds, can one justify the pursuit of a way 
of life which falls far short of the horizon of 
human potentiality? That this is a genuine ques- 
tion, one to which more than one answer is 
possible, is clear, I think, to anyone who has 
puzzled over the work of Plato and Aristotle,29 
or, for that matter, of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
who in a curious way appears to employ at 
different times both the language of virtue and, 
as noted earlier, the language of obligation.30 
I am suggesting here that the idea of moral 
and intellectual virtue is not in itself a doctrine 
or theory, but rather a question or perspective 
on the basis of which moral or political philoso- 
phy can be formulated.31 One might say that 
public is that of the compatibility of the requirements 
of justice with the requirements of the happiness 
of the philosopher. As Simon Aronson says, "If Plato 
does opt for making the city happy, and thus devises 
ways of persuading the philosopher [to be just], his 
recognition of the possible need to 'compel' (520a8) 
indicates his awareness that the tension is a real 
one." "The Happy Philosopher: A Counter-Example 
to Plato's Proof," Journal of the History of Philos- 
ophy, 10 (October, 1972), 383-398, at 396. 
29 Consider, for example, Aristotle's criticism of 
Plato's analysis of the polis in Politics 2. 1., and of 
the Platonic analysis of the good in Nicomachean 
Ethics 1. 6. 
30 Compare the understanding of politics displayed 
in the Social Contract with that of the Discourse on 
the Arts and Sciences. For a discussion of the prob- 
lem of Rousseau's political language, see Michel 
Launay, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ecrivain Politique," 
L'Information Litteraire, 22 (September, 1970), 157- 
163. Rousseau's awareness of the problem is indi- 
cated in his "Preface d'une Seconde Lettre a Bordes," 
O.C., III, p. 105. 
"Another way of putting this would be to say 
that virtue is to be taken here as a general concept 
rather than a particular conception. For a discussion 
of this distinction with reference to American con- 
stitutional concepts and conceptions, see R. Dworkin, 
"Nixon's Jurisprudence," New York Review of Books 
(May 4, 1972), pp. 27-35. 
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it provides the beginnings of a language for the 
discussion of political questions. As we have 
seen, the question of virtue turns out to in- 
volve a series of questions, starting with, What 
is the best human life? From this question arise 
the issues concerning the merits of different 
styles or ways of life founded upon the de- 
votion to actions of various kinds, and of 
various styles of inactivity or contemplation: 
what is the good of being a craftsman or a 
statesman or an entrepreneur or a soldier, and 
what is good about being a philosopher or a 
scientist or an artist or a mystic. Once these 
questions have been considered, we are then 
faced with the question of the relationship be- 
tween the virtues of contemplation and the 
political or moral virtues: Are they compatible? 
Are they simply the reflections of one single 
human excellence in different contexts? Is any 
mediation or compromise possible between 
them, and so on. As I say, these are simply 
questions, to which there are several conceiv- 
able answers, as might be seen from a com- 
parative study of the works of Aristotle and 
Rousseau. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to 
stress the nature of these questions because 
they are fundamentally different from the ques- 
tions which inform serious political inquiry at 
the present time. Given this relative absence of 
the concept of virtue from the vocabulary of 
contemporary political philosophy (as com- 
pared with the ubiquity of concepts like lib- 
erty, authority, obligation, legitimacy and re- 
lated contract-linked concepts),32 two questions 
present themselves: why we no longer speak of 
virtue when we speak of politics, and whether 
there is any reason to be dissatisfied with the 
present state of affairs. In the remainder of this 
paper I will suggest that this transformation is 
by no means accidental or superficial, but is 
rather linked with particular conceptions of the 
purpose of politics and of the character of 
meaningful discourse about politics. I will also 
try to indicate that this conception of politics 
may be unsatisfactory by virtue of being too 
narrow to deal with many important phe- 
nomena that appear to be politically relevant. 
This criticism by no means calls for a rejection 
of the language of political obligation as in it- 
self misleading or erroneous; rather, I suggest 
that there is a sufficient doubt concerning the 
utility of the modern conception of politics to 
make the serious consideration of an alternative 
conception a reasonable and even necessary un- 
dertaking. 
32 This characteristic of the modern language of 
moral and political philosophy is discussed by 
Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy." 
Alternatives to Political Virtue 
The central question of the language which 
understands virtue and politics to be nearly 
inseparable considerations is What is the best 
human life? Now if it can be shown that this 
question is absurd and unintelligible, if in prin- 
ciple no reasonable answer to it can be pro- 
vided, then the question and the substantive 
political teachings which follow from it are 
meaningless and fit to be discarded. Plato and 
Aristotle presupposed that a rational, nonidio- 
syncratic answer33 to this question is possible; 
such a presupposition is necessary if one is 
going to speak about politics in terms of virtue, 
although there is no necessity that the implicit 
assertion must itself always remain a presup- 
position: one may sooner or later be able to 
give a reasoned account of why the question 
is answerable, but in the beginning it is neces- 
sary to presuppose the meaningfulness of the 
question as a question. Now one of the de- 
fining characteristics of early modern philoso- 
phy is that it was, in several ways, engaged in 
the business of calling this presupposition into 
question, along the way to rejecting it as ab- 
surd. First of all, it was asserted that although 
we can give an answer to the question of how 
we ought to live, this answer will be so far 
removed from how we do in fact live as to be 
practically or politically irrelevant. According 
to this view, knowledge of how we ought to 
live is not in any way a reasonable or a sensible 
guide to conduct. The most famous expression 
of this assertion is Machiavelli's, in Chapter 15 
of The Prince. According to this position, the 
question of moral virtue may be appropriate in 
some contexts, but not in the sphere of poli- 
tics. It is not a very great step from asserting 
the impracticality of a political philosophy that 
takes its bearings from the question of virtue 
to an assertion of the unintelligibility or ab- 
surdity of this kind of political understanding- 
an understanding which claims to provide the 
true conception of practice or action, which 
insists upon the interdependence of morality 
and politics.34 
But if moral virtue is not a political term, 
then it can apply only to private relationships, 
"The special quality of the answer in question 
could be expressed succinctly by the Greek logo, 
which would suggest an answer by means of that 
reason which is expressed in human speech. The 
argument that the task of any moral philosophy is 
to supply "the ultimate grounds for preferring one 
way of life to another" is made by Stuart Hampshire, 
"Morality and Pessimism," New York Review of 
Books (January 25, 1973), 26-33, at 27. 
34 This step is very concisely set forth in the first 
paragraph of Chapter 11 of Hobbes's Leviathan. 
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that is to say, to relationships that are not regu- 
lated by any common authoritative standard. 
There is then something fundamentally wrong 
with a political system which claims to have as 
its primary concern the production of moral 
virtue in its citizens; morality may be the ap- 
propriate concern of churches, of families, of 
voluntary associations, but not of politics and 
government. For Hobbes and Locke, the proper 
concern of the polity, the reason for which the 
social contract comes into being, is the pro- 
tection and security of the individuals who, as 
it were, hold shares in the polity. Political au- 
thority, law, and constraint are justified not 
insofar as they tend to produce political or 
moral man, but rather insofar as they tend to 
protect economic man, the individual who is 
free to pursue whatever he desires. This idea of 
the purpose of politics, and of the true meaning 
of "political" or "civil," is expressed with ad- 
mirable concision by John Locke in A Letter 
Concerning Toleration: 
The commonwealth seems to me to be a society 
of men constituted only for the procuring, preserv- 
ing and advancing their own civil interests. 
Civil interests I call life, liberty, health and 
indolency of body; and the possession of outward 
things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture 
and the like.' 
Politics is not properly concerned with the pro- 
motion of a specific and distinct way of life, 
but only with the protection of privately de- 
termined enterprises. 
The mention of Locke in this context no 
doubt tends to emphasize the connection be- 
tween this view of politics-the view that the 
proper concern of politics is the service of 
economic man-and the liberal tradition. This 
conception of politics is surely linked with lib- 
eralism, but it is just as surely not identical 
with liberalism, being much more inclusive 
than that particular doctrine. The pervasiveness 
of this understanding of politics in modern 
times will appear if we consider that the bene- 
ficiary and the justification of the antiliberal 
and revolutionary politics of Karl Marx is pre- 
sented not as a political man or a man of 
moral virtue, but as a free spirit. The purpose 
and justification of communist society is that it 
"makes it possible for me to do one thing today 
and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, 
fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the eve- 
3 Locke, Second Treatise of Government and A 
Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. J. W. Gough (Oxford: 
Blackwell's Political Texts, Basil Blackwell, 1946), 
p. 128. See also Second Treatise, chapter 11, section 
134, p. 67. 
ning, criticize after dinner, just as I like. ..."36 
In spite of the undeniable and important points 
of opposition in the substantive political teach- 
ings of John Locke and Karl Marx, both appear 
to understand true politics (as opposed to mere 
tyranny) to be fundamentally concerned with 
the protection of what I have been calling eco- 
nomic man. Thus what seems to many to be 
the principal political alternatives of our time 
are both animated (and thus to a certain ex- 
tent defined) by a concern for liberty rather 
than for virtue, and by the understanding that 
the answer to the question of the best human 
life can not receive a political (or any sort of 
public) solution. For both Locke's householder 
and Marx's interested amateur, the question of 
how we ought to live must be treated as a 
matter of taste. 
The first modern criticism of the question of 
the best life for man is, then, that it is political- 
ly irrelevant. The second criticism to be con- 
sidered here, and one which serves as the 
epistemological or theoretical foundation of the 
first, is the assertion that the question cannot be 
answered in a rational way. To inquire about 
the best life for man presupposes that there is 
some "best" or most "virtuous" life which is 
distinct from the lives which any number of 
particular individuals may choose to lead. In 
other words, it presupposes the intelligibility of 
the distinction between what is good for human 
beings as human beings and what is pleasant to 
(or desired by) individual men and women. 
But it can be doubted that goodness or virtue 
exists, or, at least, that these qualities can be 
perceived by the human mind as having an 
existence distinct from that of pleasure. It 
would be impossible to summarize here all the 
arguments that have been developed to support 
this doubt, and so I will simply refer to some 
of the better-known conclusions. The most fun- 
damental of these may well be the assertion 
that the question of virtue, of the best life, 
cannot be settled by rational inquiry. Our ideas 
of virtue are (on this view), like our feelings 
of pleasure, the consequence of private and 
particular sensation, rather than of publicly 
36 Marx and Engels, German Ideology, Part I, in 
Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and 
Society, ed. and trans. Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. 
Guddat (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Double- 
day & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 424-425. Even in his 
direct confrontation with the liberal view, On the 
Jewish Question (in Easton and Guddat), Marx 
criticizes the liberals not in the name of equality or 
community, but of liberty or emancipation. An inter- 
esting commentary on the passage in question is pro- 
vided by Michael Walzer, "A Day in the Life of a 
Socialist Citizen," in Walzer, Obligations (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 229ff. 
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demonstrable reasoning.37 We may say what 
virtue or the best life is, but (it is asserted) we 
cannot defend (by referring to supporting rea- 
sons) our answer against any other moral pro- 
posal or preference. The attempt to philoso- 
phize about the best life appears to rest upon a 
mistaken notion of our idea of virtue; it has 
become almost a philosophical commonplace to 
say that the attempt to discover the truth about 
how we ought to live is founded on a logical 
error. Indeed, it is claimed, there is no rational 
way to distinguish virtue from pleasure, or what 
is needed from what is wanted, or what is desir- 
able from what is desired.38 Moral and political 
philosophy become theoretically incapable of 
deciding among the claims presented by different 
life styles and callings; all that philosophy can 
do is to show that no way of life, whether of 
hunter, cattle raiser, entrepreneur or critic, has 
any reasonable claim to preferential treatment 
or regard over any other way of life.39 
The question of political obligation seems to 
arise almost naturally from the situation cre- 
ated by the demise of the question of how we 
ought to live; it is the logical candidate to fill 
the vacuum in political philosophy left by the 
rejection on epistemological and metaphysical 
grounds of the question of virtue.40 If no way 
of life can authoritatively and finally claim to 
"Perhaps the most influential and painstaking de- 
velopment of this position is David Hume's, in A Trea- 
tise of Human Nature, Bk. III, Part I, sections 1-2. 
38 As in J. S. Mill's famously ambiguous claim that 
"the sole evidence it is possible to produce that any- 
thing is desirable, is that people do actually desire 
it." Utilitarianism, chapter 4, in The Philosophy of 
John Stuart Mill, ed. Marshall Cohen (New York: 
The Modern Library, Random House, 1961), p. 363. 
39 Rawls attempts to demonstrate the rationality of 
a rule of justice requiring preferential treatment for 
the least favored members of society. As Rawls in- 
dicates, however, the rationality of this rule depends 
upon the rationality of something like what game 
theorists call a maximum strategy in matters of funda- 
mental political choice. That this strategy is the ra- 
tionally appropriate one in this circumstance is open 
to question, as in the reviews by Cohen (p. 18) and 
by Hampshire (p. 39) and by Kenneth J. Arrow, 
"Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory 
of Justice," Journal of Philosophy, 70 (May 10, 
1973), 245-263. 
40 This is not at all to say that the prominence of 
the question of obligation was historically caused 
solely or even primarily by events in epistemology 
or metaphysics. At least part of the reason for the 
pre-eminence of obligation can plausibly be ascribed 
to a change in the form of the prevailing patterns of 
social interaction, roughly described by the transi- 
tion from face to face communities to the distinction 
between state and society. See Euben, "Walzer's Ob- 
ligations," pp. 439-440. Similarly, a strong case can 
be made for assigning the decisive part in this transi- 
tion to Christianity, as suggested by Hegel, The Phi- 
losophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: 
be superior to any other, and if each individual 
is thus in principle free to choose or create his 
own standards or rules of conduct, what are we 
to say about the ordinary human situation char- 
acterized by a submission to authority and an 
obedience to laws we never made? To ask this 
question is to state the modern paradox of 
liberty and authority posed in classic form by 
Rousseau in the Social Contract. What is the 
ground, the justification, of the obligation or 
duty to obey the law? When is obedience the 
result of obligation rather than of oppression 
and coercion? Perhaps the most obvious solution 
is to say that freedom itself is the ground of 
obligation: obedience to law alone makes pos- 
sible that security which is the necessary con- 
dition of freedom.41 In this manner, politics 
would appear to be justifiable or legitimate 
(and "authority" thus different from "power") 
insofar as politics exists for the sake of eco- 
nomic man. In other words, we ought to obey 
the law because it is in the interest of our 
freedom to do so. Politics thus conceived ap- 
pears as a second-rate and inconvenient ac- 
tivity, yet one which is necessary to protect us 
in our real (i.e., economic or private) exis- 
tence. Public obedience is the necessary, though 
unpleasant, price of private freedom. 
But the argument which thus employs a ref- 
erence to liberty as the ground of political 
obligation creates certain difficulties. According 
to this argument, we are bound to politics by 
an obligation which is only prudential (valid 
only so long as it is in our interest) rather 
than strictly moral (always and necessarily 
valid as a matter of duty).42 If it is not in my 
interest (as economic man) to obey the rules 
Dover, 1956), introduction, p. 18 and part IV, p. 
342, and by Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley 
Brereton (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1935), 
chapter 4. My point is rather that the philosophic 
significance of the question of obligation (and thus 
its theoretical, if not its historical, justification) can 
be grasped by a consideration of the theoretical 
grounds for discarding the question of virtue. 
41 Such a view is almost formulaic in early modern 
political thought. Among others, see Montesquieu, 
De l'Esprit des Lois, Vol. I, Book 12, Chapters 1-2 
(Paris: Garnier Freres, 1961), pp. 196-197, and 
Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 21. 
' This distinction rests on Kant's distinction be- 
tween a kind of hypothetical (nonmoral) and a 
categorical (moral) imperative. See Foundations of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis W. Beck 
(Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Mer- 
rill, 1959), section II, p. 33. For the use of this 
distinction in the context of the question of moral 
obligation, see Alan Gewirth, "Must One Play the 
Moral Language Game," American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 7 (April, 1970), 107-118. See also H. A. 
Prichard, Moral Obligation, pp. 90-91. 
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(as political man), then these rules are no 
longer legitimately binding or obligatory, so 
far as I am concerned. There can be no legiti- 
mate authority which runs counter to indi- 
vidual interest, since political (obligated) man 
is only a specialized role or aspect of economic 
(free) man. Law and government are either an 
exercise of power which is in my interest or 
one which is counter to my interest, but there 
is no reason to conclude that "authority" is 
anything more than a name we give to the 
useful or beneficial (to us) exercise of power 
(by others). What we call "political obliga- 
tion" turns out to be nothing more than a 
rather unimportant aspect of the general maxi- 
mizing strategy pursued by economic man.44 
Now this conclusion may be absolutely true; I 
am not here suggesting that it rests upon false 
premises or bad argument. But leaving aside 
the question of its truth or error for the mo- 
ment, it should be noted that the attempt to 
resolve the problem of political obligation by 
reference to the principle of liberty ends by 
calling into question the meaning of political 
activity as anything more than a special case of 
economic activity. This particular approach to 
the problem of political obligation, which we 
might without too much distortion identify as 
the liberal or utilitarian approach,45 seems in 
the end to be unable to do what it set out 
to do, namely, to distinguish the political from 
the nonpolitical without recourse to the no 
longer accepted language of moral virtue and 
the question of the best life." If it were not 
"I This confusion of authority and power would 
still exist even if we were to assume the rather un- 
likely condition that obedience to law will always 
be in our (or everyone's) interest. 
4""Unimportant" in that it deals only with min- 
imal and instrumental necessities, the items Rawls 
identifies as "primary social goods," and does not 
concern the more important question of what to do 
with the goods. 
43Although this position is characteristic of a cer- 
tain kind of modern political thought, it was by no 
means unknown to Plato and Aristotle. Consider 
Glaucon's speech about the value of justice in Re- 
public Book II; the speech of Callicles in the Gor- 
gias 483b4-484c4; Aristotle's criticism of the sophist 
Lycophron in Politics Book 3, 1280bl1-13; and es- 
pecially the statement by Antiphon the Sophist, On 
Truth, Fragment B44 in Die Fragmente der Vorso- 
kratiker, 7th ed., ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz (Berlin: 
Weidmann, 1951-54), vol. 2, 346-355. Something 
of a confrontation between this view and the posi- 
tion of ancient political philosophy is presented by 
Xenophon in his descriptions of three conversations 
between Socrates and Antiphon, Memorabilia Book 
I, chapter 6. The basic disagreement appears to be 
over the issue of human needs. On this meeting, see 
Leo Strauss, Xenophon's Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1972), pp. 28-31. 
41 One of the most systematic attempts to accom- 
for the powerful influences of custom and co- 
ercion, the public order would lose its privi- 
leged status, and the private order would rise 
up to claim what is, after all, legitimately 
its own. 
Perhaps the most interesting contemporary 
alternative to the appeal to liberty as a ground 
of obligation is the appeal to "community." 
This view, perhaps most forcefully presented by 
Hannah Arendt,47 is in an important way a 
direct response to the difficulties that I have 
claimed are endemic in the liberal position.48 
I will ignore here the question of the founda- 
tions of the "community" position (except to 
say that it also, like the liberal view, rejects the 
orientation provided by the question of the 
best life), and merely present what I take to 
be its most important conclusions or assertions. 
Principally, it asserts that genuine political ac- 
tivity can have absolutely nothing to do with 
the needs of what I have referred to as eco- 
nomic man; a truly political relationship (such 
as the relationships of obligation and authority) 
can have no connection with private self- 
interest of any sort.49 Politics itself must be 
modate the question of the best life to the question 
of liberty is made by Mill in Utilitarianism, especial- 
ly in the context of the distinction between higher 
and lower pleasures drawn in chapter 2 of that es- 
say. Whether Mill was successful is extremely con- 
troversial. A neo-Kantian refutation of Mill is given 
by R. P. Wolff, Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1968), chapter 1. That Mill was unsuccessful 
in his attempt to reconcile liberty and duty is also 
argued by Hilail Gildin, "Mill's On Liberty," in 
Joseph Cropsey, ed., Ancients and Moderns (New 
York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 288-303. An argu- 
ment for Mill's consistency is given by Rex Martin, 
"A Defence of Mill's Qualitative Hedonism," Philos- 
ophy, 47 (April, 1972), 140-151. 
IT See especially Hannah Arendt "What is Freedom?" 
in Between Past and Future (Cleveland: World Pub- 
lishing Company, 1963), pp. 143-171, and The Human 
Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958), chapters 2 and 5. Arendt's argument that the 
source of this view can be traced to Greek political 
practice seems to me highly questionable; but this 
problem has no bearing on the significance of the con- 
ception of politics involved. See also Kirk Thomp- 
son, "Constitutional Theory and Political Action," 
Journal of Politics, 31 (August, 1969), 655-681. 
48Wolff's argument in The Poverty of Liberalism 
proceeds from a rejection of the liberal position as 
logically inconsistent, to an attempt to demonstrate 
the existence (in principle) of a political community 
which can serve as the source of authority and ob- 
ligation. 
49 Just as, for Kant, a truly good action can have 
no connection with self-interest. Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Preface, p. 6; Section I, 
p. 13. On this point, Rawls is much closer to Mill 
than to Kant, in his argument that political prin- 
ciples must be in the interest of each individual for 
social control to be just or legitimate. See A Theory 
of Justice, Section 29. 
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considered a valuable activity, and the obliga- 
tion to obey the law is simply a consequence 
of membership in the political community. As 
soon as we demand that politics be good for 
something other than itself (except insofar 
as it may be understood to satisfy the irre- 
ducible human need for communal ties) it 
ceases to be politics. Needless to say, political 
relationships of this sort are extremely rare in 
those activities we ordinarily call political, at 
least at the present time. Politics in this sense, 
or political community as the true ground of 
political obligation, appears as something to be 
achieved or recovered. 
At first sight, these two relatively modern 
understandings of politics, revolving about the 
concepts of "liberty" and "community" respec- 
tively, appear to be diametrically opposed to one 
another. In fact, it may not be a great exaggera- 
tion to say that they constitute the poles of what- 
ever contemporary debate there is about the 
nature of politics and the character of political 
relationships. But I want to suggest that these 
two positions have a great deal more in common 
than is ordinarily supposed, and that they do not 
exhaust (as we are too apt to suppose they do) 
the possibilities for understanding and evaluat- 
ing political activity. One indication of the simi- 
larity of these two is that they both identify poli- 
tics as the necessary condition of human free- 
dom. According to Arendt, the political com- 
munity (like the moral community for Kant) is 
the sphere of freedom;50 according to liberals, 
politics is indeed the realm of constraint, but of 
a kind of constraint that is necessary to protect 
and enhance the realm of true freedom. To be 
sure, "freedom" is understood quite differently 
in the two different cases (the former generally 
implying a variety of self-determination, while 
the latter generally refers to a straightforward 
absence of external restraint), but the debate 
5 "Freedom as a demonstrable fact and politics 
coincide and are related to each other like two 
sides of the same matter" ("What Is Freedom?," p. 
149). This conception of freedom and politics as 
coterminous and inseparable is similar to Marx's as- 
sertion that unalienated (or free) human activity is 
species (or political) activity. See "Alienated Labor," 
in Easton and Guddat, p. 294. Another directly re- 
lated formulation is implicit in Rousseau's position 
that since freedom and citizenship are inseparable, 
and since citizenship is not always pleasant or in 
one's interest (and hence not always or necessarily 
immediately chosen for its own sake), some men 
will have to be "forced to be free" (Social Contract, 
bk. I, chap. 7, O.C., Vol. III, 364). For a compari- 
son (from a liberal viewpoint) of something like 
the two concepts of liberty I have been considering 
here, see Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," 
in his Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1969), pp. 118-172. 
between these two positions seems not to be 
about the respective merits of individuality ver- 
sus commonality as ways of life, as much as 
it is about the true meaning of being free.5' 
The reverse side of this concern with freedom 
is an almost complete avoidance of any serious 
consideration of virtue, or of any of the various 
questions which I indicated might come to 
light from an investigation of the problem of 
moral and intellectual virtue. Just as Plato and 
Aristotle can be understood to be quarreling 
over the question, Under what conditions can 
men become truly virtuous? modern political 
philosophy seems to be engaged in a debate 
over the question, Under what conditions can 
men become truly free?52 
Conclusion 
Is there any reason for dissatisfaction with 
this transformation of the basic political ques- 
tion? Surely, it can be argued that the modern 
position represents an enormous improvement 
by being much more in accord with the genuine 
limitations of human knowledge. If such mod- 
esty is in fact an intellectual virtue, then what- 
ever the merits of the ancient position, it 
might be based on the undoubtedly immodest 
presupposition that one can give an intelligible 
answer to the question of the best human life. 
Claims and criticisms of this kind raise a ques- 
tion of the greatest importance, but one that 
51 An excellent illustration of the organization of 
the debate in terms of a conflict over the true mean- 
ing of freedom is provided by Marx in his attack 
on liberalism in the name of genuine liberation in 
the essay On the Jewish Question. In criticizing lib- 
eralism for achieving "political emancipation" only, 
Marx is criticizing the liberal insistence on the sep- 
aration of politics and society, in which society 
stands for the realm which is emancipated from po- 
litical control. But, according to Marx, the real lib- 
eration of man as species-being is the emancipation 
of a creature who has evolved beyond the stage of 
"man as an isolated monad" (or free economic man) 
and has "taken back into himself the abstract citi- 
zen [of liberalism] and in his everyday life, his in- 
dividual work, and his individual relationship has 
become a species-being, . . . only then is human 
emancipation complete" (emphasis in text). On the 
Jewish Question, in the Easton and Guddat edition, 
pp. 235-241. A similar distinction is drawn by Hegel 
in his argument for political (or universal) freedom 
in preference to individual (or particular) freedom in 
Philosophy of History, Introduction, p. 38, and in 
Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), sections 182-187. 
2A good discussion of this in the context of 
constitutional issues is that by Walter Berns, Free- 
dom, Virtue and the First Amendment (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1957), especially 
chapter 10. 
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will not be discussed here. That question, as 
difficult as it is important, concerns the de- 
termination of the reasonableness of a presup- 
position. Here, I would like only to suggest 
why I think it is worthwhile to go to the 
trouble of trying to revive a buried presupposi- 
tion. To do this I will try to show why the 
two modern formulations of the political ques- 
tion that have been considered here are, taken 
together, unsatisfactory. I am not here con- 
cerned to provide a conclusive showing of the 
wrongness of these formulations, but only to 
show why it seems advisable to think seriously 
about alternatives. 
When I say that the modern formulations 
neglect virtue, I am using that word to refer to 
any possible answer to the question of the best 
way of life, and not to some particular answer: 
when we say how men ought to live, we say 
what human virtue is.is Now, in a sense, the 
modern political formulations do have some- 
thing to say about how we ought to live 
(although this question, for them, arises only 
incidentally): we ought to be free,54 and poli- 
tics is either the most reasonable means to that 
end or itself the process within which the end 
is realized. In a very broad sense, we are even 
presented with a choice between two ways of 
life each of which has certain claims to be 
considered the most worthy of praise or vir- 
tuous: the life of individual liberty (of eco- 
nomic man liberated from unnecessary political 
control) versus the life of the autonomous citi- 
zen in the free community (political man lib- 
erated from the impurities of economic life). 
But just what sort of a choice do these alter- 
natives offer us? Both appear to involve what 
amounts to a one-dimensional understanding of 
politics, in which politics are classified and 
evaluated according to the degree to which 
either liberty or community is said to be pres- 
ent.55 I do not mean to deny that this dimen- 
sion is an important one; but it would be diffi- 
cult to show that it is in fact the primary 
I Again, at this point in the argument "virtue" 
is intended as a concept rather than a conception, 
in terms of the distinction referred to in note 31. 
5 Freedom here is understood very broadly, and 
in this sense can include an idea of security or se- 
cure preservation. An example of this usage can be 
found in the passage in Montesquieu referred to in 
note 41 above: "Political liberty consists in security, 
or at least in the opinion that one has of one's se- 
curity." 
" This is the source of the distinction between the 
open and the closed society. The not so remote 
vulgarizations of these paired oppositions are the 
popular divisions of contemporary politics into Free 
World vs. Slave World, and Third (communitarian 
nationalist) World vs. Imperialist (capitalist) World. 
political dimension of variance, from which all 
other aspects of political life are derived. 
Let us try to see what might happen if we 
were to take seriously the idea that the question 
of the presence or absence of freedom (defined 
in either of the two ways considered to this 
point) is the key or essential political question. 
Consider the following situation: let us assume 
a fairly constant level of either individual lib- 
erty or community, and then ask whether at 
this level we will find other differences which 
appear to call for other, unrelated, distinctions, 
or whether knowledge of the level of liberty or 
community tells us, in principle, all we need 
to know about the polities in question. If we 
were to choose several relatively strong com- 
munities-say, the early Catholic Church, 
Sparta, the People's Republic of China and the 
Mafia-and several relatively liberal polities- 
say, the United States of America, Athens, 
Great Britain and Sodom-I believe that we 
would be confronted by a problem in political 
understanding which could not be resolved by 
the language of liberty or community alone. In 
this example, we should want to be able to say 
something about the values or the goals which 
are characteristic of each of these polities, in 
addition to considering the matter of liberty 
and community. These examples would appear 
to suggest the possibility that differences in the 
uses of liberty, and in the purposes for the sake 
of which communities may be organized, may 
be decisive for the character of the polity in 
question. If this is so, then a political phi- 
losophy which is incapable of explaining and 
evaluating these differences may turn out to be 
of very little use in the face of the most im- 
portant and the most difficult political ques- 
tions.56 The purity of community appears to 
match, in narrowness and blindness to a wide 
range of politically relevant things, the well- 
known poverty of liberalism.57 
That political philosophy which takes its be- 
5' Of course, these may be classified as "cultural" 
differences, and since (given cultural relativism) they 
are therefore incommensurable (at least morally), 
they are not fit subjects for a generalizing and eval- 
uative political philosophy. I am not concerned here 
with the possible truth of this claim (it would be 
necessary to examine the plausibility of the asserted 
moral incommensurability of cultural phenomena); 
but note that this position implies a political philos- 
ophy which, at least in its explicitly evaluative pro- 
cedures, must ignore the political consequences of 
"culture." 
67 This point is brilliantly, though perhaps too 
briefly, made by Benjamin DeMott in his essay, "Pure 
Politics," which reviews the work of Arendt and 
others. DeMott, You Don't Say: Studies of Modern 
American Inhibitions (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, Inc., 1966), pp. 169-182. 
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ginnings from the question of political obliga- 
tion appears to end by abstracting from the 
variety of purposes or goals which may be said 
to belong to different polities. This abstraction 
is not accidental or unprepared, but follows 
from the kinds of questions that are regarded 
as the proper subjects of modern political phi- 
losophy, questions about liberty, obligation, 
legitimacy, and so on. These questions are all 
focused, in various ways, on the manner in 
which the polity is constituted, rather than on 
the goals or values of life styles which the 
polity explicitly encourages or implicitly re- 
wards. These latter considerations appear to lie 
outside the perspective provided by the two 
principal varieties of modern political philoso- 
phy discussed in this paper (,although they 
form the major theme of ancient political phi- 
losophy). What we might describe as the shift 
from the virtue paradigm to the legitimacy 
paradigm appears to have been accompanied 
by a severe narrowing of the range of ques- 
tions which inform philosophic inquiry into the 
political things.58 This narrowing, as I have 
tried to suggest, may be distorting with respect 
to our grasp of political reality, in confining 
our attention to an insufficient, and perhaps 
even occasionally unimportant, range of politi- 
cal phenomena. Now I want to be very clear 
in indicating that I have in no way "refuted" 
the legitimacy (or obligation) paradigm; I 
have made no effort in this discussion to deal 
with the epistemological, logical and moral is- 
58 I am using "paradigm" here only for clarifica- 
tion, and with almost the same meaning that I wish 
to convey by the word "language." Paradigm refers 
to the heart or grammar of the language, the rules 
for the proper ordering of concepts and vocabulary, 
the element that gives the language its particular 
character and structure. This usage is like the one 
established by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), chap. 5; however, I do not share, and 
the use of "paradigm" here should not be taken to 
imply, Kuhn's relativist assertion of the incommensu- 
rability of competing paradigms. The case for con- 
sidering the history of political ideas in terms of 
paradigms is presented by Bhiku Parekh and R. N. 
Berki, "The History of Political Ideas: A Critique 
of Q. Skinner's Methodology," Journal of the His- 
tory of Ideas, 34 (April, 1973), 163-184, and by 
W. H. Greenleaf, "Hume, Burke and the General 
Will," Political Studies, 20 (1972), 131-140, es- 
pecially 139-140. 
sues which are involved in the question of the 
justifiability of the paradigm change.59 What I 
have tried to do is to suggest that there are 
serious objections which can be made to the 
necessary products or consequences of the legit- 
imacy paradigm, and that these objections pro- 
vide sufficient warrant to examine the possi- 
bilities of another approach to the problem of 
understanding and evaluating political relation- 
ships. That alternative approach is one which 
formulates the problem of the best human life 
in terms of the problem of intellectual and 
moral virtue.60 
59 Leo Strauss's controversial discussions of these 
issues are of continuing importance. Relevant here 
are the Introduction to The City and Man, Strauss's 
"Epilogue" to Essays on the Scientific Study of 
Politics, ed. Herbert J. Storing (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1962), and his essays 
"What Is Political Philosophy" and "On Classical 
Political Philosophy," reprinted in Strauss, What Is 
Political Philosophy? (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959). 
The strongest and broadest defense of the modern 
understanding of political philosophy is still Karl 
Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: 
Routledge, 1945), Vol. I. An interesting discussion 
and criticism of some of the central features of the 
modern paradigm is provided by Bruce Aune, "The 
Paradox of Empiricism," Metaphilosophy, 1 (April, 
1970), 128-138. An interesting consideration of the 
theoretical alternatives underlying the alternative con- 
ceptions of morals and politics is presented by Ken- 
neth Dorter, "First Philosophy: Metaphysics or 
Epistemology?," Dialogue 11 (March, 1972), 1-22. 
60 The importance and interest of Rousseau for a 
study of the strengths and limits of the two con- 
ceptions of politics discussed here can hardly be 
overemphasized. Rousseau's treatment of politics in 
the Social Contract and elsewhere presents one of 
the best known uses of the legitimacy paradigm, 
"community" variation. And yet Rousseau also in- 
sists, in a way that other legitimacy theorists (like 
Hobbes and Locke) do not, on the intimate con- 
nection of (a kind of) virtue and politics. More- 
over, no reader of Rousseau can avoid being im- 
pressed by the depth, complexity, and even by the 
uncertainty, of his concern with the question of the 
best life. Unlike almost any other modern writer, 
Rousseau was led by this concern to consider not 
only the question of the best political life, but also 
that of the best alternatives to politics or citizenship, 
thereby compelling his readers to engage in the pro- 
cess of comparing political virtue with nonpolitical 
virtue or virtues. In the terms of this analysis, Rous- 
seau holds a unique position as an uncommonly bril- 
liant (though not necessarily successful) link be- 
tween the language of legitimacy and obligation on 
the one hand and the language of virtue on the 
other. 
